Ayn Rand is most well-known for her libertarian politics; she is also known for the individualistic aspects of her ethics. But she made various claims in epistemology; she has a theory, or a set of remarks, about the formation of concepts. The basic idea is that we are able to grasp, pre-conceptually, differences in degree of qualitative similarity and difference between objects, and form the ability to treat objects that are relatively qualitatively similar to one another as though they were — we are able to apply what we’ve learned from one object to another object in the future because the second object strikes us as similar to the first. She has what she thinks of as a technical innovation to explain how we do this; it isn’t successful except perhaps in a handful of cases. But here, I want to mention her description of the formation of concepts of mental states. She says that we form these concepts by recognizing the similarities between our own mental states, using introspective awareness as an analogue for perceptual awareness. But what kind of similarities?
In the realm of introspection, the concretes, the units which are integrated into a single concept, are the specific instances of a given psychological process. The measurable attributes of a psychological process are its object or content and its intensity. (ITOE 31)
It’s in terms of contents and intensity that mental states can be similar to, or different from, one another. What it is for a particular mental state to fall under the concept of a kind of mental state is for it to be, in terms of contents or intensity, commensurable with other mental states that fall under that concept: relatively similar. (Rand has trouble with the concept of commensurability; she thinks that being measurable by a common unit qualifies objects as similar to one another, when commensurability would only guarantee that it was similar to or different from it.)
On this account, I am the only thing in the universe that has any mental states. Take, for instance, the mental state of belief. Now, I have various beliefs. I believe that my backpack is blue and that this tea is lukewarm. These beliefs are beliefs because they are commensurable with other beliefs in terms of their content and intensity.
If you believe that this backpack is blue, or anything else, then my belief and yours are as commensurable, in terms of their contents, as any two of my beliefs. How we measure the facts or states of affairs or propositions that are the contents of beliefs, I can’t guess, but apparently Rand thinks that it’s possible.
But no belief of yours has any intensity comparable with the intensity of any belief of mine. There is no common metric; we can’t compare any belief of mine with any belief of yours according to their intensities. Thus my beliefs and the beliefs of another person are not commensurable. They are not similar (or even different) in intensity. Thus they do not fall under my concept of belief: they are not beliefs. No one but me has beliefs.
The same point would apply to concepts themselves: your concepts have no quantity of intensity that I can “omit” to bring them under my concept of concepts. Thus you have no concepts.
Thus, on Rand’s theory, I am the only being in the universe to have concepts, beliefs, or any other mental state at all. On Rand’s theory, Rand never accepted any theories.
Obviously, Rand did not accept solipsism (much less solipsism for me). But because of the casual and inattentive way in which she describes the workings of the mind, she did imply solipsism.
leonid said:
Color or temperature are not beliefs, nor they are concepts. They are percepts which could be integrated into concepts If one perceive two or more blue coloured objects he could integrate these percepts into concept of blue color by ommission of different hues of blue. Evidently all humans with normal perception and mind going through this process, otherwise we wouldn’t be able to communicate at all. In any case your claim has nothing to do with Rand theory of concepts.
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bregister said:
Experiences of color and temperature are not percepts. We don’t experience experiences. To form the concept of experience, if we do that introspectively, one would omit quantitative information about the content and intensity of experiences. Others’ experiences have no intensity that one can omit. Thus others’ “experiences” could not fall under one’s concept of experience: they would not be experiences.
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Leonid said:
Thinking is much broader term that concepts formation. It includes induction and deduction logic, memory communication. thinking is an ability to operate with concepts. You cannot think on preconceptional level.. so why you need to ommit intensity of thinking in order to form concepts?
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bregister said:
BECAUSE AYN RAND SAID SO. You keep talking, here and on Twitter, as though I were just making things up. AYN RAND SAID THINGS. I QUOTE THOSE THINGS. And then I point out implications, in this case, absurd ones, of what SHE says. I did not come up with this foolishness about intensity. AYN RAND came up with this foolishness about intensity.
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leonid said:
As for formation concepts from concepts you look for a common denominator between them and ommit the difference. So red blue and yellow have one thing in common-they are colours. And this concept becomes a genus while concepts which describe individual colours become species. Now how it follows from this that reality don’t exist and Ayn Rand is a solipsist?
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bregister said:
I’m not talking about the concepts of various colors. I’m talking about the concepts of experiences of and beliefs about and concepts of colors. It doesn’t follow that reality doesn’t exist. It follows that you do not think. I formed my concept of thinking by omitting quantitative information about the contents and intensity of my thinking. Your “thinking” has no intensity that I can omit, so it does not fall under my concept of thinking, so it is not thinking. Likewise for every mental state.
You understand that I’m saying that Ayn Rand commits herself to solipsism, not that solipsism is true? And that Ayn Rand commits herself to solipsism without realizing that she has done so, not that she willingly adopts solipsism.
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Leonid said:
What concept formation has to do with intensity of thinking.? How you can ommit it ?what is the meaning of concept of experience? The whole statement is strange
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bregister said:
Surely when you use the word ‘experience’, you mean something by it? You have the concept of chairs; you have the concept of tables; you have the concept of planets; you have the concept of experiences; you have the concept of chickens…
The concept formation that has to do with the intensity of thinking is the formation of the concept of thinking. You’d have to ask Rand how you can omit intensity; she’s the one making the claim.
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Leonid said:
In any case one doesn’t form concepts on the basis of beliefs.. Belief by itself is a misconcept. There or knowledge or lack of thereof
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bregister said:
You don’t have the concept of belief? How do you explain human action? If nobody believes anything, then no one would ever believe that anything should be done. How could I know that e.g. it is Thursday if I don’t even believe that it’s Thursday?
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Leonid said:
Experience is not. a concept. It is a vague descriptive term which includes perceptual experience, encounters, mental states like emotions or dreams or fantasies or hallucinations. Nothing to do with concept formation
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bregister said:
The concept of experience is a concept. It has to do with the formation of the concept of experience.
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Leonid said:
Better to say experience is a misconcept because it includes too many completely unrelated units. If I say that I had an experience you won’t know what actually happened to me.
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bregister said:
I won’t know that you had an experience? For all I know, you were actually an automaton at the time?
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leonid said:
The meaning of the quote is that every body forms mental concepts based on his own personal mental experience. It’s an individual, not collective process. Why do I need to measure intensity of your thinking to form my mental concepts? The same applies to the concepts based on perception. If your claim is right then all concepts are invalid since I don’t have access to your perception as well. But the fact is that we all living in the same universe and have minds which operate similarly. We form concepts individually but able to communicate them. In fact your obWe don’t have collective mind but we all can think.
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bregister said:
I form the concept, Rand says, based on introspection. But I ought to be able to apply it to other people. But other people’s mental states are not commensurable with mine. So I can’t apply the concept to others’ introspectively given states.
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Leonid said:
You can’t apply concepts to other people. You can only communicate them. by giving a clear definition. You cannot apply your dreams to me but may say “a dream is X “
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bregister said:
Excellent. So we’re agreed: according to Ayn Rand’s theory, my concepts of e.g. dreams, thinking, concepts, don’t apply to you. Thus, according to Ayn Rand’s theory, you have no dreams, thinking, or concepts. (In just the same way that my concept of trees’ not applying to this chair is the same as this chair’s not being a tree.)
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Leonid said:
No, what I mean is that concepts are not applicable outside of their contents. You can apply concept of chair to chairs and dream to dreams. But to the people you can apply only concept of man. However you can share any concept with other people by means of definition..
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Leonid said:
According to Ayn Rand concept formation is an independent volitional action of mind. Of individual. . There is no interactions between different minds during such a process. And via introspection we know that we create all concepts just by ourselves without to commensurate the intensity or content of the other people ‘s thoughts. The whole process of ommission is individual.. Does it mean that others don’t think? Such a claim is non sequitur. Could be your concept of dreams or memories be essentially different from mine? No, if we integrate data in non-contradictory way and our premises pertain to reality.. That means we can share concepts, but even this process is active and requires s critical examination of concepts validity.
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bregister said:
“Does it mean that others don’t think? Such a claim is non sequitur.” Others’ thoughts have no intensity commensurable with the intensity of my thoughts. So others’ thoughts are not commensurable with my thoughts. So they are not units of the same concept. So others’ thoughts do not fall under my concept of thoughts. But that is to say that they are not thoughts. Please, you must focus and eschew irrelevant, distracting rhetoric.
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Leonid said:
They are units of the same concept because mental states like emotions, dreams, memories and thoughts are shared by all people.. We all have them. . All people will perform the same process of integration by common denominator and ommission of non-essential by forming concept of dream.. They all will arrive to the conclusion that dream is sensory event which occurs during the sleep.. Does this concept apply to your dreams? If yes, what is wrong with Rand theory of concepts?
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bregister said:
Your emotions and so forth are not commensurable with mine because they are neither more nor less intense than, or as intense as mine. So your emotions don’t fall under my concept of emotions. That is to say, you don’t have emotions. (According to Rand’s theory.) Only I do. Likewise with all such concepts. That is to say, you have no mental states, concepts, knowledge, experience, dreams, or anything else. (According to Rand’s theory.) Only I do. You have to actually pay attention to this point about intensity.
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Leonid said:
Re-intensity. Ayn Rand referred to different intensity of the mental state of the same person who form concepts… Intensity is not an essential characteristics and thus could be ommited. In the process.. The essence of mental state. is a common denominator and a basis of its concept. Comensurability of my and your mental state is irrelevant because the. end result. a concept would be the same for all people.
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bregister said:
Oh, yes, intensity is not an essential characteristic. But Ayn Rand says that the commensurability of mental states in terms of intensity is a condition on their falling under concepts.
And, no, on Ayn Rand’s theory, commensurability is not irrelevant. What it is for two objects to fall under one concept is for them to be recognized as commensurable.
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Leonid said:
There is also no comensurability intensity of your vision to mine. Does it mean that your concept of trees not applicable to yours? Intensity is ommited in the. process. How it could be relevant to concepts application?
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bregister said:
My concept of trees isn’t applicable to your vision. It’s applicable to trees.
Measurement-omission works on a some-but-any principle: to qualify as an experience, something must have some content and some intensity, but it can have any content or intensity.
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Leonid said:
That’s true and exactly because a concept is applicable to all mental states with any content and intensity there is no need to commensurate intensity of mental states of different people. Every body creates such a concept by himself by ommission of intensity and content.. But when it’s created such a concept is applicable to all. And that exactly what Ayn Rand said.
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bregister said:
Your mental states don’t have some-intensity-but-any-intensity. They are not more intense than mine, less intense than mine, or as intense as mine. They have no intensity measurable by me. I cannot say of them that they have any intensity. So I cannot say of them that they have some intensity. So I cannot say of them that they have some intensity but any intensity. So they are not commensurable with my mental states. So they are not mental states.
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Leonid said:
But they are commensurable with your own mental states, therefore you can form concepts. I really can’t say anything about first person experience, can’t feel your pain or emotions. But it doesn’t prevent me to form concepts which define mental states of all people.
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Leonid said:
For example I have different memories with different content and intensity. They all commensurable. I can ommit intensity and contents and form a concept of memories as a faculty which allows to retain and recall percepts and mental states.. This definition will include memory of all people since it’s an essential characteristic of human mind.
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bregister said:
All of the units of a concept have to be commensurable, not just the ones that you were aware of when you formed the concept. (Otherwise, everything would fall under every concept.)
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Leonid said:
In order to form concept you don’t need all units. Just two of them are sufficient. Besides how can you integrate units which you unaware of? What is true that all units have to have a common denominator .
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bregister said:
Having a common denominator is being commensurable.
PWNI: “Abstract ideas are conceptual integrations which subsume an incalculable number of concretes” …and hence not just however many you happen to have encountered.
ITOE: “Conceptual awareness is the only type of awareness capable of integrating past, present and future. Sensations are merely an awareness of the present and cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment; percepts are retained and, through automatic memory, provide a certain rudimentary link to the past, but cannot project the future.”
The entire point of a concept is that it integrates unperceived units along with the perceived ones. Otherwise, one couldn’t apply to new objects knowledge that one had acquired about prior ones.
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Leonid said:
Well, that is true. When concept is formed it includes all related units. However to form the concept you need just two commensurable units
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bregister said:
Yes, and the concept then applies to all of the other things that are commensurable with those units. It doesn’t apply to things not commensurable with those units.
This conversation has taken me from being pretty sure that Rand’s view committed her to solipsism, to being absolutely certain of it.
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Leonid said:
You mean that mine and your mental states don’t have common standard of measurement?.in other words we belong to different species.? if that was a case then Rand would be a solipsist. But fortunately it isn’t. Mental states of man and bat are not commensurable. But of man and men are.
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bregister said:
No mental state of yours is more intense than any mental state of mine. No mental state of yours less intense than any mental state of mine. No mental state of yours is as intense as any mental state of mine. The intensities of our mental states are not commensurable.
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Leonid said:
.But I and you could have the same mental states with different intensity.. They are commensurable..We don’t need a mutual comensurability in order to form concepts. However our mental states have common denominator and therefore your concept of certain mental state is applicable to everyone.
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bregister said:
I cannot compare the intensity of your mental states to the intensity of mine. No mental state of yours has any number of units of intensity that any mental state of mine has: we cannot add or divide the intensity of any of my mental states and get the intensity of any of yours. Because no mental state of yours feels less intense, more intense, or as intense as any mental state of mine, no mental state of yours is in any place in an ordering of the relative intensities of my mental states. The intensity of my mental states, and the intensity of your mental states, are not commensurable.
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Leonid said:
You can’t and you don’t need to.. It’s not required for concepts formation.. Enough that your own introspective data is commensurable. Yet concepts when formed applicable to all.
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bregister said:
They’re applicable to other units commensurable with the units from which the concept was formed. Not other things not so commensurable.
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Leonid said:
Well, that doesn’t follow. You have to show that applicability depends on comensurability.. In regard to the concepts based on perception it’s not true. Why it should be true for the introspective concepts?
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bregister said:
The entire point of Rand’s theory of concepts is that the units are commensurable with one another — that’s exactly what it is for them to fall under the same concept. It is true in regard to the concepts based on perception.
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Leonid said:
Yes. Commensurable but within individual mind. There’s no such a thing as collective consciousness.. Each and every person forms concepts on his own.. However these concepts are applicable to all units as long as they pertain to objective reality.
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bregister said:
Please stop tossing in this irrelevant rhetoric about a “collective mind”.
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Leonid said:
And yet application of concepts doesn’t follow from comensurability. It belongs to the process of concepts formation.,not their application… For example one may create an arbitrary concept using comensurability but he won’t be able to apply it to any unit of existence..
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bregister said:
For an object to fall under, or be a unit of, a concept is just precisely for it to be commensurable with the other units of the concept. That is all that there is to the application of concepts. We have hit the point of zero returns; you simply need to read the book that you’re trying to defend.
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Leonid said:
Maybe you too should integrate the ideas you try to refute.. ” The content is some aspect of the external world….and is measurable by the various methods of measurement applicable to the external world. The intensity of psychological process is automatically summed up result of many factors…. Degrees of intensity can be and are measured approximately on a comparative scale…. The intensity of a process… varies according to the scope of its content… ” (ITOE 31) This is the part of the quote you choose to ommit. But it’s essential in understanding of the Rand theory. Contrary to the Realist theory mental events cannot be subtracted from the objective reality, only differentiated from it. Intensity of mental process defined by content which pertains to external world of existents. Since we all live on the same planet all mental concepts applicable to all mental units.
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bregister said:
I disagree. I’m pretty sure that you have thoughts. They’re introspectively available to you, but they also fall under my concept of ‘thoughts’.
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Leonid said:
But that exactly what I said. Concept of thought is applicable to thought . The question now is whether or not we share the same concept?
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bregister said:
My concept of thought is applicable to my thoughts. But it isn’t applicable to yours, because yours and mine are not commensurable in terms of intensity. So yours aren’t thoughts. (According to Rand’s theory.)
Whether we can share concepts or not is a matter of which page of ITOE you’re looking at. She has three or four incompatible views on the matter.
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Leonid said:
That’s not true, providing that both concepts formed by rational means and pertain to reality…
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bregister said:
The units of a concept have to be commensurable. Your thoughts are not commensurable, in terms of intensity, with my thoughts. Thus they are not units of my concept of thought. Thus, you have no thoughts. (According to Rand.)
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Leonid said:
Not sure what do you mean by your notice about sharing concepts. Ayn Rand stated very clearly that every word designes concept and communication therefore is concepts sharing
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bregister said:
Unfortunately, she has multiple views about how words and concepts relate. You’re right; they “designate”, but they also, in a dozen other places, they “are”, concepts.
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Leonid said:
Reference please
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bregister said:
Register, Bryan. 2000. “The Universality and Employment of Concepts.” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 1:2. (Spring, 2000.) pp. 211-244.
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Leonid said:
Not applicable to mine
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Leonid said:
Concept is a concept exactly because it doesn’t include intensity or content. Therefore it’s applicable to everyone
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Leonid said:
All units with common denominator are commensurable by definition. But you can commensurate only those units which are presented to your consciousness. Your claim that one should be able to commensurate all units is a claim for omnipotence and Ayn t never claimed that..
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bregister said:
Commensurable and commensurated aren’t the same.
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bregister said:
It includes some-but-any intensity or content.
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Leonid said:
” all the units of a concept have to be commensurable “-comensurability is a mental process. And you cannot be aware of all units.. According to. you one cannot form any concept..
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bregister said:
Measuring is a mental process. Commensurability is not. At this point, I can only recommend that you read Rand’s *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology*.
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Leonid said:
Sorry, comensurability means measures by common standard.. Check your definitions. And measurement is definitely a mental process
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bregister said:
Commensurability doesn’t require that the things actually be measured.
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Leonid said:
No it just requires common standard of measurement. Which all people definitely have.
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Leonid said:
” concept pertaining to consciousness is a mental integration of two or more instances of psychological process possessing the same distinguishing characteristics with the particular content and the measurements if the action ‘s intensity ommited. on the principle that these ommited measurements must exist in some quantity but may exist in any quantity ” ITOE 31 -32. So if you tell me that your mental process has no content which pertains to reality and no intensity whatsoever, I would agree that it’s not commensurable and my mental concepts don’t include your mental units.
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bregister said:
No mental state of yours is less intense than any mental state of mine. No mental state of yours is more intense than any mental state of mine. No mental state of yours is as intense as any mental state of mine. Your mental states have no intensity. (Thus, they are not mental states — you have no mental states.) (And, to repeat again: this is an implication of Rand’s view. It is not the truth. Obviously you have mental states.)
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Leonid said:
I don’t understand the ground on which you made this statement.. Ayn Rand never said so and it doesn’t follow from her theory of concept formation. Her theory is based on assumption that all mental processes have some intensity..
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Leonid said:
I think you confuse concepts with contents. Intensity is a property of content. Concepts of course have no intensity.
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bregister said:
Intensity is a quality of whatever sorts of thing that Rand thinks can be the units of introspectively based concepts. No, obviously intensity is not a property of content. First, if it were, then Rand shouldn’t have distinguished it from content. Second, the content of a mental state is something worldly that is not given to introspection; the content would exist whether was anything’s content or not, but the intensity would not.
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Leonid said:
You mean that units of introspection, your dreams memories etc…have no contents?? This is worse than solipsism.. Of course they have contents of different intensity which pertain to objective reality.. Yes they are worldly as you put it.. “Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward… In regard to some existents of the external world “( ITOE, 29) We isolate the action of consciousness from its content by differentiation, not by Realist subtraction.. The contents of your dreams or memories could be clear or vague.
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bregister said:
No, I don’t mean that.
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Leonid said:
You said that content of the mental state is not given to introspection.. That means you don’t know what your dreams memories or thoughts are. That means you can’t think “
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bregister said:
The ground is that there is no way to compare the intensity of any mental state of mine with the intensity of any mental state of yours.
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Leonid said:
But so is your vision hearing feelings.. It doesn’t mean that one cannot find a common denominator in each of these processes and form a concept which includes all mental units of all people. Since we assume that all mental units have contents and intensity of some quantity, they are commensurable. And this assumption is based on the fact that we all possess human minds. The
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bregister said:
You have no right to that assumption. It is provably false (as I’ve shown). That other people have minds is something that is in doubt, when what it is to have a mind is to have introspectively graspable states of some kind.
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Leonid said:
Well. this pure solipsism. We know that other people have minds by observing them.
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bregister said:
We don’t observe other minds. And, yes, solipsism is the implication of Rand’s view that I wished to emphasize with this post about Rand’s solipsism.
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Leonid said:
We observe other people, communicate with them and learn that they have minds. Your claim about Rand solipsism still have to be substantiated.
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bregister said:
How do I learn that? Not by discovering that they, like I, have introspectively given objects with intensities, since they don’t have such objects, since nothing that isn’t introspectively available to me is more intense, less intense, or as intense as anything that is introspectively available to me.
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Leonid said:
The same way you know that a car has engine petrol and driver if it’s properly moving. You don’t need to open bonnet just use the power of deduction
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bregister said:
How am I supposed to deduce that something is in someone else’s mind that isn’t? There is nothing in anyone else’s mind that is more intense, less intense, or as intense as anything in my mind.
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Leonid said:
The level of intensity in somebody else mind has nothing to. do with one’s ability to form concepts.. We know that all people have mental processes of some intensity.. Intensity is part of identity of such a process. The basis of your knowledge therefore is law of identity.
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bregister said:
We’ve been through “forming” and “applying”.
Of course we know that other people think. But if Rand’s theory were true, then we wouldn’t know it — indeed, they wouldn’t think.
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Leonid said:
Still I fail to see how it follows from the Rand theory.
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bregister said:
Yes, I know.
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Leonid said:
I’m really trying hard to make sense from what you have said so far.. Give a formal presentation of your argument.. Show what exactly Rand’s fallacy is.
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bregister said:
I’m not able to improve on the original presentation. It’s much easier than you think that it is. You just have to stop assuming that Rand is right. And there is no opportunity for fallacy in her claim, as there is no argument in it.
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Leonid said:
I don’t assume that Rand is right and I don’t assume she is wrong. I simply trying to understand your argument. And I think I did
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Leonid said:
I don’t assume that Rand is right and I don’t assume she is wrong. I simply trying to understand your argument. And I think I did Basically you claim that Rand is wrong because we don’t possess telepathy.. I’ve shown that there is no such a requirement, not according to Rand anyway.
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bregister said:
But if you’re serious about “formal”:
For any x and for any concept C, x falls under C if, and only if, there is a y such that y falls under C and x is commensurable with y.
(Rand’s theory in general; stated for context)
1. For any x, y and any introspectively based concept I, if x and y fall under I, then x and y are commensurable in intensity.
(Rand’s theory specified for introspection)
2. For any x, y, if x and y are commensurable in intensity, then x is less intense, more intense, or as intense as y.
(def. ‘commensurable’)
3. There are no w, x, y, or z such that w is introspectively given to (person) x and y is introspectively given to (person) z, such that w is less intense, more intense, or as intense as y.
(def. ‘introspection’, ‘intensity’) (Why is this true? As it’s self-evident, I can’t prove it, but I can try to inspire a reader to grasp it. I am currently frustrated. There is no way to compare my frustration to the frustration of any other person. I am not more frustrated than someone else. I am not less frustrated than someone else. I am not as frustrated as someone else. Introspectively felt intensity is [or would be, were there any such thing] terminally private for the person feeling the more-or-less intense state, and not comparable with anything to which that person is not privy. Ask whether your headache is, by introspective awareness, more or less intense than someone else’s. We might be able to measure the intensity of a headache in terms of how many aspirin someone wants to take, but that’s not introspective.)
4. There are w, x, y, z, and I such that w is introspectively given to (person) x and y is introspectively given to (person) z and x and y fall under I.
(assumption for reductio )
Then, 5: There are a, b, c, d, and I such that a is introspectively given to b and c is introspectively given to d and a and c fall under I.
(4, existential instantiation)
Then, 6: a and c fall under I.
(5, simplification)
But, 7: if a and c fall under I, then a and c are commensurable in intensity.
(1, universal instantiation)
Further, 8: if a and c are commensurable in intensity, then a is less intense, more intense, or as intense as c.
(2, universal instantiation)
So, 9: a is less intense, more intense, or as intense as c.
(6, 7, 8, hypothetical syllogism)
But, 10: There are a, b, c, d, and I such that a is introspectively given to b and c is introspectively given to d.
(5, simplification)
So, 11: There are a, b, c, d, and I such that a is introspectively given to b and c is introspectively given to d and a is less intense, more intense, or as intense as c.
(9, 10, conjunction)
Thus, 12: There are w, x, y, or z such that w is introspectively given to (person) x and y is introspectively given to (person) z, such that w is less intense, more intense, or as intense as y.
(11, existential generalization)
Unfortunately, 13: lines 3 and 12 contradict one another.
By contradiction: at least one of lines 1-4 is false.
However, line 1 is a partial definition of “introspectively based concept”; it can be found to lack application to anything real, but it cannot be false, and lines 2-3 are self-evident. Thus, line 4 is false: nothing introspectively given to one person can fall under the same introspectively based concept as anything introspectively given to any other person.
Thus, no introspectively given state of any other person can fall under any the same introspectively based concept as anything introspectively given to me.
The obvious conclusion is that there are no such concepts to begin with; our concepts of mental states and so forth are not based on introspection, at least not as Rand thinks that they are.
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Leonid said:
There is no contradiction because there is no requirement that qualities of mental processeses of all people have to be given to us introspectively.. We know that these qualities exist simply because mental processeses exist in all people by definition. Without qualities like intensity speed sharpness etc…mental processes has no identity and therefore doesn’t exist.. Therefore all qualities exist in any quantity and thus are commensurable.
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Leonid said:
1.Man is a rational being
2.Mental process M exists in all people
3. M has identity which is its qualities and they could exist in any quantity.
4.All people possess mental qualities like Intensity etc
5 All mental qualities are commensurable
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Leonid said:
Correction M has identity which is its qualities like intensity and content
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bregister said:
What is this of?
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bregister said:
They flatly are not commensurable. We cannot measure the intensity of my headache in terms of the intensity of your headache.
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Leonid said:
Since qualities could exist in any quantity the measurements are not required. You yourself mentioned that comensurability doesn’t involve actual measurements. . It’s sufficient to know that they exist.
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bregister said:
Ordinarily, I am paid for this sort of work.
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Leonid said:
Since qualities could exist in any quantity the measurements are not required. You yourself mentioned that comensurability doesn’t involve actual measurements. . It’s sufficient to know that they exist.. Comensurability simply means that these qualities have common denominator.
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bregister said:
There have to be measurements. They don’t have a common denominator in terms of introspectively given intensity.
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Leonid said:
But you yourself said that comensurability doesn’t have to involve measurements. It is enough to know that units exist and they have certain qualities in any quantity. . Since I know that your mental processes are as such and since I formed mental concepts by means of introspection I can include all units in existence.. You also mentioned that units which existed and will exist are commensurable.. Evidently they can’t be measured by any means. . The process of comensurability is process of mental deduction, not direct measurements.
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bregister said:
IF mental processes exist in other people by definition, how did I form the concept of the mental process? From introspection? Then it only applies to units commensurable in intensity with the introspectively given units, which something not given to my mind cannot be. From extrospection? Good, we’re Wittgensteinians and have rejected Rand.
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Leonid said:
You form concepts by using introspection of your own mind. The contents and intensity of your mental processes are easily available to you..and commensurable. You can ommit quantities and. Contents of your dreams or memories or toothaches and form concepts of them. These concepts would include the mental units of all people because they do the same.. We know that because people by definition are rational beings.
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Leonid said:
Furthermore, do you realize that your argument is self-refuting? Mental concepts necessarily are formed by introspection and this is always 1st person experience. So according to you there is no way to know how people form mental concepts. I may do it according to Rand and you according to Kant for example.. In other words mental concept is unknown thing in itself,, epistemology is waist of time and all this lengthy discussion is futile.
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Leonid said:
We observe our mental states by introspection but those of other by extraspection.. It’s not difficult to observe that other person in severe pain. We also can communicate contents and intensity of our mental states.. But to do so one needs first to form mental concepts. So if you tell me – I had a vivid dream. I will understand you because I have dreams myself and have a concept of dream. But if I never dreamed, there is no way to explain to me what it is.. In other words all mental processes are commensurable as long as people have concepts of them.since we all have similar mental states with common denominator.
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bregister said:
I can’t observe someone else’s mental states. You’re right, if we had concepts that applies to other people’s mental states, then those mental states would be commensurable. But they are not commensurable in terms of introspectively given intensity.
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Leonid said:
Comensurability doesn’t involve direct observation or measurements by any means… Otherwise the concept of tree wouldn’t be applicable to the trees which existed million years ago. Comensurability is a process of cognition which involves induction and deduction.
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bregister said:
Mental concepts are not necessarily formed by introspection; they are not formed by introspection.
Distinguish two kinds of mental phenomena. First, there are intentional states such as perception, belief, desire, intention, and so forth. These are theoretical posits introduced to explain human action. They are not formed by introspection or be extrospection either. Second, there are phenomenal states like headaches, feeling as though one is looking at something green, and so forth. These are formed by extrospection, though we apply them to ourselves based on introspection.
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Leonid said:
I understood that we don’t discuss here concepts formed on the basis of perception.. These concepts pertain to existence outside of man’s mind. However concepts which include mental states could be formed only on the basis of introspection unless you find a way to get out of your mind and observe it from the outside.
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Leonid said:
Besides, people can communicate information about their level of intensity of different mental processes.
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Leonid said:
To summarise if other people think then this process has to have intensity..
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Leonid said:
In other words can perform ommission of intensity and contents only because I assume that all mental states of all people have some content and intensity.. And that means all mental states are commensurable and all mental concepts are applicable to all mental units
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teloscientist said:
Unfortunately, I cannot read through all (I read through a couple dozen) the comments to find it this has been addressed:
I cannot determine the intensity of your belief. However, I can dialog with you and discover that you have an intensity to your belief.
Isn’t that enough to achieve the kind of commensurability to which Ayn Rand refers? That is exactly how I personally do it.
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bregister said:
My belief only has an intensity insofar as it can be felt. You can’t feel that intensity. So, no, you cannot do the comparison. My beliefs and yours are incommensurable in introspective terms for the simple and obvious reason that no one can introspect anyone else’s introspectable states.
You can determine some sort of behavioral intensity based on dialogue.
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Leonid Fainberg said:
Introspective terms are not a requirement for comensurability.. Extraspectively I can say that your beliefs in realism are quite intense.. That would be enough to form concepts.
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